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Abstract
Successful navigation of our complex social world requires the capability to recognize and
judge the relative status of others. Hence, social comparison processes are of great impor-
tance in our interactions, informing us of our relative standing and in turn potentially
motivating our behavior. However, so far few studies have examined in detail how social
comparison can influence interpersonal decision-making. One aspect of social decision-
making that is of particular importance is cooperative behavior, and identifying means of
maintaining and promoting cooperation in the provision of public goods is of vital interest to
society. Here, we manipulated social comparison by grading performance rankings on a
reaction time task, and then measured cooperative decisions via a modified Public Goods
Game (PGG). Findings revealed that individuals ranked highest tended to be more coopera-
tive as compared to those who placed in the bottom rank. Interestingly, this effect was
regardless of whether the comparison group members were the subsequent players in the
PGG or not, and this effect was stronger in those with higher social orientation. In summary,
the present research shows how different social comparison processes (assessed via social
rankings) can operate in our daily interaction with others, demonstrating an important effect
on cooperative behavior.
Introduction
Social comparison is an extremely important factor in how we interact with others. This pro-
cess provides a direct evaluation of where we stand in relation to others, and provides an indi-
cation of the characteristics of ourselves that we should modify in order to improve in a variety
of ways. In the animal world, social rankings and hierarchies are ubiquitous, and primates, in
particular, are quite adept at comparing themselves to one another via social rankings, a capac-
ity that has important consequences for successful group living [1]. The human world is no
less sensitive to hierarchies. There is a strong tendency to compare oneself with others, to esti-
mate and tag others, and then categorize them along a spectrum of importance, often termed
“social status,” in view of how valuable we perceive that person to be. Those whom we deem as
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high value like politicians, celebrities, athletes, film stars, and so forth, we place at the top of
our social rankings, while those we typically consider as low value fall to the bottom of our
social hierarchy [2]. Successful navigation of our complex social world demands an ability to
identify and estimate the relative status of others, and knowledge about others’ standings can
help us to optimize our own social value.
A considerable amount of previous experimental work has demonstrated a clear and strong
relationship between social comparison and behavior. For example, players who exhibited rel-
atively better performance during social interactions were judged by others as worthy of a
larger prize [3]. We can, therefore, talk about ‘downward’ social comparison, when we are bet-
ter off than others, as well as ‘upward’ social comparison when we are worse off than our
peers. Social comparison seems, therefore, natural, but when coupled with behavioral or affec-
tive consequences it can have striking effects on decision-making [4–6]. For example, house-
holds perceived to be economically worse off in comparison to others reported less purchasing
decisions for durable goods, and thought more seriously about purchasing decisions [7]. In a
lottery task, individuals who experienced a large social gain in early trials as compared to oth-
ers subsequently increased their risk-seeking behavior in the following trials [8, 9]. In short,
social comparison processes illuminated the interpersonal concern by overshadowing the con-
cern for personal outcomes independent of others. Given the impact of social comparison on
even quite fundamental decisions outlined above, such as consumer purchases or risk choices
under uncertainty, we might expect that decisions made in an interactive social context [10]
would be even more susceptible to the influence of our social comparative processes, and
indeed social information has been shown to influence decisions in a wide variety of domains
[11]. Comparison of recycling behaviors between oneself and the ‘average’ person altered
households’ subsequent recycling decisions [12], as well as towel (re)use in hotels [13]. Individ-
ual perception of the seriousness of one’s own legal infringement in terms of downloading
software from the internet depends on beliefs about one’s position within the distribution of
illegal downloaders in the UK, rather than the objective positions[14]. This evidence suggests
that that social comparison holds considerable sway in social decision-making in our daily life.
An important social decision that we are often faced with is whether or not to cooperate
with others. Successful cooperation offers considerable benefits for ourselves and for others,
but sometimes places us at risk of our cooperative acts being abused, and can be therefore a
risky choice option. Ensuring sustained cooperation is challenging because cooperation
sometimes has a price, namely that one can be taken advantage of by a so-called ‘free-rider’.
Despite this, human cooperation plays a vitally important role in the development and func-
tioning of society [15]. A unique distinction of the human species is that they shape social life
by minimizing selfish behaviors and developing cooperative agreements with normative
responsibilities and obligations [16, 17]. Nevertheless, the origin of cooperation, especially in a
competitive world, is still somewhat of a puzzle for philosophers, economists, psychologists,
and neuroscientists [18–21]. Hence, exploring and recognizing individual and situational fac-
tors that help in understanding cooperative behaviors is of great importance.
The Public Goods Game is an effective and useful tool to study mutual cooperation in the
laboratory. [22]. This game models the willingness of players to contribute to the maintenance
of a so-called ‘public good’, that is, a common resource that can freely be used by anyone with-
out regard for whether one has contributed or not, for example, a public park. While the col-
lective is best served by the existence of such a public good, each individual’s optimal choice is
to withhold contribution and instead free-ride on the participation of others. This tension
between public and private benefit is one extremely important consequence of cooperation.
Ideally, everyone would gain a significant benefit based on mutual cooperation by contributing
the maximum amount, but a self-interested tactic is to contribute nothing and reap the
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benefits of other’s cooperative acts. The PGG is an effective and useful tool to study mutual
cooperation, and research has found that incentives such as reward and punishment are suc-
cessful at promoting cooperative behavior within the group [23, 24]. Nonetheless, despite
extensive use of this experimental task, there have been few explicit tests of how social compar-
ison can impact cooperative behavior in this particular context.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore how social comparison can affect coopera-
tive decision-making, and to gain an insight into psychological processes underlying these
effects. In order to achieve this goal, we address three specific research questions. Firstly, and
most importantly, if social comparison indeed describes how we stand in relation to others, as
we have outlined above, then how might different types of social comparison (i.e. upward or
downward) affect and modify interpersonal decisions in a cooperative context? As described
previously, evidence from a variety of studies suggests that there are robust effects of social
comparative processes on purchasing decisions, risk choices, and fairness perceptions. Taken
together, relative performance can initiate a downward or upward comparative process, which
we would then expect to impact subsequent cooperative decisions [25].
Secondly, people usually have beliefs about the typical behaviors of others in societies,
namely social norms, and often adjust their own behavior in accordance with this information.
Therefore, beliefs about specific others might also be relevant to decision-making, especially in
a social context [26]. Assuming social comparison processes do affect cooperative decision-
making, we were also interested in knowing how these regulatory behavioral effects were influ-
enced by specific knowledge about those with whom one must cooperate. To answer this
research question, we manipulated participants’ beliefs about their cooperative partners. In
one case, they had knowledge about how the players in their cooperative group ranked relative
to themselves—that is, the cooperative group were the same players as those they had previ-
ously competed with, and had been directly compared to (Relevant targets). In the second con-
dition, the cooperative group was comprised of new players chosen after the social comparison
task, that is, the participant had no direct knowledge of how he or she ranked relative to these
players (Irrelevant targets). This allows us to better understand whether social comparison
subsequently affects interactions only with those we know our rankings relative to, or whether
the affective and cognitive processes altered by knowing one’s rank can have a more general
impact on behavior, irrespective of who we interact with.
Finally, we are also interested in individual sensitivity to social comparison [27]. Social
comparison orientation (SCO), as defined by Gibbons and Buunk [28], refers to the tendency
to compare oneself to others [29]. Previous research found that high SCO individuals reported
relatively more positive effect after downward comparison and more negative affect after
upward comparisons when they perceived a cooperative social climate at work[30]. This evi-
dence shows that individual’s social comparison orientation tendencies would give rise to
more salient effects on the subsequent interpersonal outcomes. To this end, we will assess indi-
vidual differences in social comparison orientation by using the Iowa-Netherlands Compari-
son Orientation Measure (INCOM) [28], and examine how this measure corresponds to
cooperative decision-making under conditions of both upward and downward social
comparisons.
We addressed these research questions by designing a paradigm in which participants
would receive feedback about their performance in a task, in a social context, and then we sub-
sequently observed their willingness to cooperate in an ostensibly separate task. To generate
social comparison, participants completed a simple reaction time task at the same time as 4
other players. After a button press in response to a color-cue, participants were informed
where they ranked amongst the 5 players, with the particular conditions of interest being rank
#1, rank #3, and rank #5, corresponding to downward, neutral and upward comparison
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conditions, respectively. After this manipulation, participants then played a standard PGG
with either the 4 players they had been ranked against, or with 4 new, unranked, players. This
allowed for an examination of whether any comparison effects were limited to those players
who were actually in the comparison group, or whether they extended to novel players. In
addition, participants played a third set of PGGs without a prior ranking task in order to assess
their baseline levels of cooperation.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 39 college students from Radboud University Nijmegen, with an age range
from 20 to 30 years (M = 23.03, SD = 2.39). They were recruited via advertisements informing
them that they would be playing a decision-making game, and were compensated 8 euro for
participation. There was an additional 8 euro payment possible based on their performance.
On average, participants earned 4 euro as a bonus payment. The study protocol was approved
by the local ethics committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) under the
general ethic approval (CMO 2014/288), and all the experimental methods were conducted in
accordance with these guidelines. All participants provided written informed consent in accor-
dance Declaration of Helsinki and the guidelines of local ethics committee.
Procedure
Instructions and practice. Participants were instructed as to the nature of the experiment.
They were told that over the course of the experiment they would be paired up with other par-
ticipants who had previously taken part in the study. They were informed that their own
responses would be used by later participants, but that this data would be completely anon-
ymized. It was explained that on each trial of the experiment, participants would be paired
with 4 other (anonymous) players, and that they would never play with the same set of players
twice. They were told that they could receive a monetary bonus of (maximally) 8 euros in total;
6 euros based on performance in the Public Goods Game (PGG: see below), and 2 euros based
on average ranking in the Circle task (see below). After that, they practiced the Circle task, and
then saw six practice trials of the PGG, with all conditions practiced. They were allowed to ask
questions during the instructions and practice session, and the experiment did not begin until
it was clear that they understood the instructions.
Social comparison manipulation: Circle task. A simple perceptual task was used to
manipulate social comparison. In the circle task, a small colored circle moved around the
periphery of a larger static white circle. In each trial, the start color of the small circle was to be
randomly assigned from a color pool of red, purple, blue, green, pink and yellow. The color of
the small circle was then randomly replaced by another color in the pool at a random interval
of between 0.64–0.8 seconds. The task for the participant was to press any key on the keyboard
as soon as they detected that the color of the small circle had changed. Participants were
informed that their performance measure was based on both the accuracy and the speed of
their response. Following each trial of the task, a ranking list was generated based on the per-
formance of 5 purported players in the task. In reality, this ranking list was pre-programmed
so that the participant appeared systematically at each ranking. Participants were ranked from
#1 to #5, with higher likelihoods of ranks 1, 3, and 5. The rankings were determined randomly,
with the proviso that rank 1 or 5 was automatically assigned if the response time was less than
0.05 s or larger than 1 s respectively (Fig 1).
Cooperation measure: Public goods game. A Public Goods Game was used to measure
cooperation. In each trial of the game, participants were randomly paired with 4 other,
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anonymous, players. Participants were endowed with 10 tokens at the start of each trial and
had to decide how many of these tokens they wanted to contribute to the group account and
how many of the tokens they wanted to keep for themselves. Once all the players decided how
much to contribute, the total contribution to the group account was then multiplied by 1.6,
and this final amount was divided equally across all 5 group members. Earnings in each trial
are therefore the sum of the tokens participants did not contribute to the group account (initial
tokens minus contribution) plus the payment from the group account (aggregated contribu-
tions to group account multiplied by 1.6, then divided by 5).
Behavioral testing. Three conditions were measured in the experiment, each consisting
of 12 trials, for a total of 36 trials (Fig 1). Condition 1 (Basic-PGG) provided a baseline, with
participants playing the Public Goods Game with 4 other anonymous partners. In Condition 2
(Same Group-PGG) and Condition 3 (Different Group-PGG), participants first played the
Circle Task with 4 other anonymous partners. Following each trial of the task, a ranking list
was generated based on the performance of the 5 purported in the task. In reality, this ranking
list was pre-programmed so that the participant appeared systematically at each ranking. Par-
ticipants were ranked from #1 to #5, with higher likelihoods of ranks 1, 3, and 5. After partici-
pants have seen the ranking list, in Condition 2 (Same Group-PGG), participants immediately
followed by playing the PGG with the same set of partners, whereas in condition 3 (Different
Fig 1. Experimental tasks and timelines. (a) A single trial of the basic public goods game. In this condition, participants are randomly
paired with 4 anonymous partners to play the standard public goods game, (b) A single trial of the same group public goods game. In this
condition, participants are randomly paired with 4 anonymous partners for the circle task, and then play the public goods game with the same
set of people, (c) A single trial of the different group public goods game. In this condition, participants are first randomly paired with 4
anonymous partners to play circle task, and then paired with another 4 partners to play the public goods game.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175472.g001
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Group-PGG), participants then played the PGG with a different set of 4 partners. In both Con-
dition 2 and 3, on average, players were ranked #1 3 times, #3 3 times and #5 3 times. We ran-
domized the entire 36 trials, consisting three experimental conditions, for each participant.
The first condition allows us to measure a baseline performance in a PGG, and then com-
pare that performance to the other conditions where social ranking information is presented
immediately before contribution decisions. The latter two conditions then enable us to distin-
guish between situations where the rankings are relevant for the cooperative decision (Same
Group condition) or where they are irrelevant for that choice (Different Group condition).
Post experiment questionnaire. After completion of the experiment, participants filled
out two short questionnaires. The first consisted of questions about the experimental proce-
dure. The next was the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM) [28],
which was used to examine individual differences in social comparison orientation. After-
wards, there was a short interview about the strategy used during the experiment. Finally, a
selection of trials was randomly chosen for each participant and randomly paired with choices
from four other real participants to calculate their Public Goods Game bonus. Participants
received an average of 1 euro for their Circle Task bonus, as these rankings were largely
predetermined.
Results
Individual’s baseline-level of cooperative behaviors
We first examined performance in the Basic Public Goods Game (where no competitive rank-
ings were supplied) as an indicator of the general type of cooperative behavior exhibited in the
task. Descriptive statistics of the contribution amount in this condition demonstrated consid-
erable individual differences in behavior, though almost all participants contributed something
on average (M = 3.83, SD = 2.91, 3 always contributed zero, and 1 contributed the maximal
amount in every round) (see Fig 2).
Effects of experimental conditions on cooperative behaviors
The main purpose of this study is to examine how the rankings and groups influence coopera-
tive decisions, as well as the role of social comparison orientation. Firstly, for analysis of the
cooperative decisions, we used each participant’s contribution amount in the Basic Public
Goods Game as a baseline measure, and then computed the deviations from that amount for
each of the conditions of interest, namely the two other Public Goods Games (Same group and
Different group) for each of the three ranking levels (#1, #3, #5). A 2 × 3 × 2 three-way mixed
repeated analysis of variance (ANOVA) was implemented including group (same, different)
and rank (top, middle, and bottom) as the within-subject factors and social comparison orien-
tation tendency (High Social Comparison Orientation group, HSCO; and Low Social Compar-
ison Orientation group, LSCO) as the between-subject factor. Fig 2 provides an overview of
the results. The results show that the contribution amount was significantly affected by the
rankings in both the Same and Different group conditions, F (2, 74) = 6.12, p<0.01. Further
analyses across the different ranking conditions found that there was a significant linear trend,
F (1, 37) = 8.43, p<0.01, indicating that as the rank increased, contribution in the both Same
and Different group Public Goods Game increased proportionately, with the contribution
when top-ranked (M = 2.73%, SD = 1.61%) greater than that when middle ranked (M = 1.42%,
SD = 1.43%), which in turn was greater than that when the bottom ranked (M = -4.00%,
SD = 1.59%). However, there was no main effect of group (F (1, 37) = 0.42, p = 0.52), and also
no interaction was found (see Fig 3).
Social rank and social cooperation
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Individual differences of social comparison orientation on cooperative
behaviors
We are further interested in individual differences, and how sensitivity to social rank might
play a role in cooperative decisions. For the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation ques-
tionnaire data analysis, the median of participants’ social orientation questionnaire score was
40 (M = 39.13, SD = 6.04), which was used as the threshold to separate the participants into
LSCO (N = 20) and HSCO (N = 19). An independent-sample t-test showed that the social
comparison score in the HSCO group (M = 43.95, SD = 2.68) was indeed significantly higher
than the LSCO group (M = 34.55, SD = 4.56), t (37) = -7.80, P<0.001.
To test how manipulated rankings impacted individuals with different social comparison
orientation. A 2×3 mixed repeated ANOVA was implemented, including social comparison
orientation (LSCO, HSCO) as a between-subject factor, rank (top, middle, and bottom) as the
within-subject factor, and the contribution deviated from baseline condition as independent
variable. Greenhouse-Geisser correction was carried out as the spherical hypothesis was vio-
lated. We found that the main effect of rank was significant in the HSCO group, F (2, 36) =
8.97, p< .001, though not in the LSCO group, F (2, 38) = 1.20, p = .31 (see Fig 4).
Discussion
In this study, we investigated the effects of social comparison on cooperative behavior. We
hypothesized that social comparison, via its role in the assessment and evaluation of the self
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Fig 2. Individual differences of contribution in the baseline condition—Basic PGG.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175472.g002
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and the others, would affect social decision-making. The particular decisions we were inter-
ested in were choices about how much to cooperate with others, in particular when this coop-
erative choice comes with the risk of exploitation by free-riders. Firstly, we were interested in
the respective effects of upward and downward social comparison on cooperative decisions.
The former refers to a comparison with those who are relatively better off than we are, while
the latter occurs when we compare ourselves to those worse off. Secondly, we also explored
how these social comparison effects impacted both ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ targets. Here we
defined relevant targets as partners in the cooperation task with whom participants had been
previously directly compared with on simple cognitive task, whereas irrelevant targets were
those partners in the Public Goods Game with whom there was no previous comparison pro-
vided. Finally, we examined how individual differences in social comparison orientation, as
assessed by an independent measure, could potentially underlie these effects.
Our primary findings of interest were that, firstly, when people earned a place in the top
rank of players, thus inducing downward social comparison, we observed a significant increase
in cooperative behavior in the subsequent PGG, as compared to participants’ own baseline
level of cooperation when playing without any social information. In contrast, when people
were in the bottom rank, resulting in upward social comparison, their cooperative behavior
decreased. Importantly, these effects did not depend on whether the comparisons were with
relevant (Same group condition) or irrelevant targets (Different group condition), with similar
results in evidence for each set of targets. Finally, when examining individual differences in
Fig 3. Deviation of mean contribution rate from the basic public goods game in the same and different group conditions across
ranks.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175472.g003
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these changes in cooperative behavior, we found these effects were strongest in participants
with high social comparison orientation scores.
Regarding our first research finding, on trials in which individuals achieved a higher rank
on the cognitive task, on average they made more cooperative decisions, that is, they contrib-
uted significantly more to the public good than on those trials where they were placed at lower
ranks. Additionally, while we found that higher social ranks enhanced cooperative actions, as
described above, conversely, our results demonstrated that finding oneself ranked bottom of
the list led to a significant decrease in cooperation. As showed in our task, the Circle task
(ranking process) and the Public Goods Game (decision process) are the separate and inde-
pendent task. Therefore, rational individuals’ decisions in the public goods game according to
to the classic economic models should not be influenced by the rankings in the previous circle
task. These interesting effects can potentially be explained in several ways. Firstly, higher rank-
ings imply an advantageous position and represent higher competence, which is likely experi-
enced as a social reward in most societies [31–34]. This social reward process may well have a
generally positive impact on mood (similar to ‘warm-glow’) [35, 36] which could in turn lead
to alterations in subsequent behavior, such as higher contributions in the following PGG [35,
37, 38]. In a similar vein, the negative emotion experienced by low ranked status (e.g., frustra-
tion, sadness) could elicit less willingness to engage in social interactions [39, 40] and thus
fewer cooperative decisions in the subsequent PGG. An alternative account is that relative
performance derived from the social comparison task might lead to an advantageous or
Fig 4. Deviation of mean contribution rate from basic public goods game in the same and different group across low social
comparison orientation and high social comparison orientation group.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175472.g004
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disadvantageous social experience during the interactions with other players, which could
then enter into the subsequent decision-making via social or interpersonal utility [11]. Accord-
ing to the inequality aversion model [20], individuals have a robust aversion to disadvanta-
geous inequality in situations where they are confronted with poorer performance or
outcomes in comparison to others. In addition, many people also demonstrate an aversion to
advantageous inequality, that is, avoiding outcomes where they are made considerably better
off than their game partner. This inequality aversion explanation suggests that fairness consid-
erations about the relative performance of players on the cognitive task may come into play
[41, 42]. Thus, individuals’ social preferences of inequality aversion might modify the subse-
quent cooperative decisions in an interpersonal context [20, 42]. Specifically, a strong distaste
for disadvantageous inequality might decrease their interpersonal utility, which would explain
why individuals at lower ranks decrease their subsequent cooperative behaviors in the PGG;
whereas individuals’ reluctance to assume the position of advantageous inequality might
increase their social utility, which can explain why individuals at higher ranks raise their con-
tribution in the succeeding PGG. A third plausible explanation for our findings is that the
increased cooperative behaviors observed by the higher ranked players might be motivated by
considerations of avoiding anticipated negative emotions caused by (e.g., guilt)[43]. By this
account, individuals with a higher rank might feel that cooperative behavior is expected of
someone who is a ‘winner’, and this social norm may guide subsequent decisions to be more
generous, and thus avoid the guilt associated with taking further advantage of one’s game part-
ners[26]. Conversely, task ‘losers’ may subsequently decide to maximize their own profit in the
game, and thus, contribute relatively less.
Given that there was a Circle task bonus, which participants were informed they could earn
additional 2 euros if their average ranking across all the social comparison trails were above
rank 3, one may argue that a simple non-social motivation to maximize financial outcome
could have played a role in the changes from the baseline in the average contribution in the
other two social comparison PGG tasks. In our opinion, firstly, the 2 euros bonus was based
on the average ranking in the Circle task across all the social comparison trails that participants
would not experience any monetary gain experience in a single trail during the task. Therefore,
the social comparison effect should play a dominant role in the modification the motives for
the following contribution tasks. More importantly, if this argument is true, which means
potential monetary reward would occur in rank 1 and 3 but not in rank 5 in a single social
comparison trial, we should observe the effect in condition rank 1 and 3 rather than rank 5
(supposed to be no effect at all). However, in fact, our results showed that the experience of
bottom rank (rank 5) during the Circle task decreased their contribution in subsequent PGG,
which demonstrated the social comparison effect.
A second important result which can help shed light on the potential mechanisms of coop-
eration outlined above emerges from the two separate ranking conditions we employed here.
In one condition, participants took part in the PGG with players they had previously been
directly ranked against (‘relevant’ targets), while in a second condition they played the PGG
with a different group than those they had been ranked with (‘irrelevant’ targets). Nonetheless,
participants showed very similar patterns of cooperation across both conditions (greater coop-
eration for downward comparison, lesser cooperation for upward comparison). Given what
we have discussed above about the inequality aversion model, one might hypothesize that the
social comparison processes would have a greater impact on individuals’ contribution in PGG
with relevant as opposed to irrelevant targets. However, participants tended to treat the two
groups the same way regardless of ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’ compared targets. Further, if play-
ers’ beliefs about the expectation of others would lead to changes in subsequent cooperative
decisions, then one might again expect that this would occur to a larger extent in those they
Social rank and social cooperation
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had been ranked against, as opposed to a set of players with whom they had no previous expe-
rience. Therefore, we believe this most plausible mechanism for the alterations in cooperative
decisions as a function of social comparison is one of affective bias. The positive emotions
from a ‘winning’ rank enhance cooperation independent of whomever one is engaged in the
PGG with, while a ‘losing’ rank leads to indiscriminately lowered cooperative choices. These
results can be integrated with findings of pro-social (e.g., charity donation) decisions, in which
research found the neurobiological evidence of reward processing when people prosocially
interact with others [44–46]. Moreover, this was supported by studies of social exclusion,
whereby people in a disadvantageous social situation, socially excluded by others, decrease
their prosocial behaviors [47], for example, in terms of offering less to others in a Dictator
Game [48].
Finally, our results clearly demonstrated that social comparison effects on subsequent coop-
erative decisions were much more salient to those individuals who independently scored high-
est on a test of social comparison orientation (SCO). This effect suggests that individual
differences in social comparison orientation play a vital role in subsequent decision-making.
According to the selective accessibility model [49, 50], social comparison effects may activate
two different processing manners: contrast or assimilation. These effects could also extend to
the following cooperative decisions depending on the processing of similarity (assimilation
process) or dissimilarity (contrast process) of the targets. In the social comparison processes,
individuals tend to seek similarities or dissimilarities between self and others. Our results sug-
gest that high SCO individuals might engage processing more broadly and deeply in the simi-
larities of the comparison targets in situations of downward comparison, while focus more on
processing dissimilarities of the comparison targets in the upward comparison scenario [51].
In summary, the present study provides novel experimental evidence for the role of social
comparison processes on cooperative decision-making. Our design allows us to clearly show
that psychological processes based on positive feedback from social comparison promotes
increased cooperation in some circumstances and reduced cooperation in others, indicating
that social preferences and social emotions play a crucial role in the interpersonal cooperative
decision-making. In addition, particular contextual information, such as upward or downward
social comparison, can adjust cooperative rates accordingly. Furthermore, individual differ-
ences in social comparison orientation mediate the comparison effects in both up- and down-
ward comparison processes. In conclusion, the current results could integrate to the findings
of the recent studies that have been conducted to understanding human cooperative behavior
[52–54], therefore, not only provide novel evidence for the theories of social comparison, but
also provide important implications for our daily life. Future work could usefully extend this
behavioral paradigm by exploring the neural mechanisms underlying social comparison pro-
cesses on cooperation.
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